Maine Policy Review
Volume 5 | Issue 2

1996

Options for Managing Maine’s Fisheries:
Traditional Fisheries Management
Ralph Townsend
Winona State University, RTownsend@winona.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/mpr
Part of the Aquaculture and Fisheries Commons, and the Economic Policy Commons
Recommended Citation
Townsend, Ralph. "Options for Managing Maine’s Fisheries: Traditional Fisheries Management." Maine Policy Review 5.2 (1996) : 29
-35, https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/mpr/vol5/iss2/4.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UMaine.

Options for Managing Maine’s Fisheries
Maine Policy Review (1996). Volume 5, Number 2

We follow Commissioner Alden’s interview with two perspectives on fisheries management
prepared by University of Maine faculty, Ralph Townsend and Jim Wilson. Townsend discusses
the historic evolution of fisheries management as well as more current trends toward comanagement in Maine’s groundfisheries. Looking at successful experiences with comanagement, he wonders whether current efforts in Maine’s lobster industry will be successful
without tackling the tough issue of access limitation.
Jim Wilson counters Townsend’s concerns. The current policy course set by Commissioner
Alden is based on an approach to fisheries management which redefines the sustainability
problem as an ecosystem problem. Wilson argues that, within this new paradigm, questions such
as “how, when, and where” to fish (or not fish) are much more central than species-specific
quota setting, and that these questions not only change the rules under which co-management is
implemented but also may improve fisheries management in ways that quota systems have failed,
that is the long term conservation of species and habitats.

Traditional Fisheries Management
Ralph E. Townsend
Introduction
Fisheries have been an integral part of Maine’s history and its economy. Although fisheries have
declined in relative importance to Maine’s economy (fisheries products now account for about 2
percent of Maine’s gross state product), these industries continue to be central to Maine’s image
as a maritime state. As the interview with Commissioner Robin Alden suggests, Maine seems on
the verge of making fundamental changes in how its fisheries are managed. A complex set of
forces, many beyond Maine’s direct control, require a rethinking of Maine’s historic strategy of
limited interference in its fisheries. Where Maine will end up after this historic transformation is
not at all clear.
A History of Fisheries Management
General acceptance of the idea that marine fisheries require management has occurred quite
recently in historic terms. That other renewable resources, such as forests and agricultural
resources, require human regulation has been recognized for a much greater part of history. Two
factors tended to work against the idea that marine fisheries should be managed. First, the oceans
seemed so vast that it was plausible to believe that marine resources were essentially unlimited.
Second, even if marine resources required management, management of marine fisheries was an
inherently difficult task. The activity of fishing occurs on individual boats far from the shore.
Unlike land-based resources, where boundaries could give an owner dominion over a well-

defined set of resources, the use of the ocean was difficult to regulate. Until the 1970s, all of the
marine resources beyond a 3- or 12-mile territorial sea was open to exploitation by anyone in the
world. The idea of property rights which worked for land-based resources did not easily transfer
to the sea.
For many marine fisheries, unregulated harvesting was a plausible, even reasonable, approach
for hundreds of years. As long as fishers relied upon the unpredictable and risky power of the
wind, human society rarely was able to seriously overfish a marine resource. (An early exception
was whales, which were particularly vulnerable to overharvest.) But with the coming of steam
power and internal combustion engines, fishers pursued fish over wider and wider areas with
boats that increased in size and fishing power. By the early part of the twentieth century,
traditional fishing grounds off Europe and North America were showing signs of over-fishing.
After World War II, mechanization of fishing vessels accelerated and large industrial fleets
began to fish down stock after stock around the world.
In the 1970s, coastal countries began to extend their jurisdiction to 200 miles. The Magnuson
Fisheries Conservation and Management Act declared a 200 mile “exclusive economic zone” for
the U.S. In areas such as Georges Bank, the exclusion of foreign trawlers created an opportunity
for a major expansion of the domestic fishing fleet. This bonanza did not last long, however.
Soon it became apparent that domestic boats were just as capable of overharvesting as were
foreign boats.
Concepts of fisheries management existed long before passage of the Magnuson Act. Formal
theories to explain overfishing had been developed by biologists working in the 1930s through
the 1950s. These theories indicated that the appropriate solution to overfishing was to limit total
catches to the “maximum sustainable yield.” Biologists used data from scientific studies and
from catches to predict what amount of fish could safely be taken from the stock of fish. The
basic idea was to limit catches to no more than the amount by which the stock of fish grew each
year. Biologists urged governments to set limits on fishing, called “total allowable catches” or
“quotas.” Many governments enacted such limits and some fisheries seemed to be preserved by
such limits.
Biologists also developed theories to explain why it was desirable to regulate fishing gear to
harvest selectively. By using larger mesh in nets or using larger hooks, fishing gear would tend
to capture larger, more slowly growing fish and let smaller, more rapidly growing fish escape.
Biologists also argued for fishing closures in certain fisheries, as when fish are heavily
concentrated on spawning grounds.
But problems became apparent even in some fisheries that were managed by quotas. Some
stocks continued to decline even though quotas were in place. Some of the problems were
political. Governments did not always enforce quotas to which they had agreed. Sometimes
governments disregarded the advice of scientists and set higher quotas in response to political
pressures. And a peculiar problem became apparent in a large number of fisheries subject to
quota management. Even though catches were limited, more and more fishers entered the
fishery. As more fishers pursued a fixed allocation, quotas were exceeded and fishing had to be
halted. And as more fishers continued to enter, fishing seasons had to be closed earlier and

earlier each year. In some fisheries, the seasons became a few weeks or even a few days of
frenetic competition for the fixed quota.
While this behavior defied explanation at face value, it could be explained by classic economic
theory. Fishers continue to enter as long as it is profitable to do so. Consider, for example, 100
fishers who are catching the total quota and earning a net income of $100,000 per year. Assume
that there are another 10 people who know how to fish and who are earning $35,000 per year at a
shore-based job. Those ten people will decide to enter the fishery, even though they will not
increase the total catch (which is limited by the quota). By entering they will reduce the catch
and income of the fishers already in the fishery, but they can expect to earn much more than
$35,000. In fact, if there are a large number of potential fishers who all earn $35,000 per year at
some other employment, then entry will be attractive as long as income from fishing is higher
than $35,000 per year.
By the 1960s, an economic solution to this dilemma had been proposed. It entailed setting limits
on the number of fishing permits issued, an approach known as “limited entry.” Beginning in the
late 1960s, some governments began to implement this approach. In some fisheries, limited entry
seemed to have the desired effect of stabilizing fishing effort. And, as economists had predicted,
the right to fish gained an economic value. The fishing permit that gave fishers the right to fish
was a new kind of property, something like the right to use a piece of land, and this property had
value and yielded profits.
But, like quotas, limited entry developed problems (Townsend, 1990). Governments often issued
many more fishing permits than were warranted. And individual fishers started to build bigger
and more powerful boats. It was profitable for each fisher to use the fishing permit on a larger,
more powerful fishing vessel in order to catch more fish. In fisheries with over-all quotas, this
increased fishing power would catch the available fish in shorter periods. The ever-shorter
seasons reappeared. In fisheries without quotas, this increased fishing pressure often resulted in
overfishing.
As these problems became clear in the 1970s, another approach to management was proposed. It
divided the annual quota into pieces and gave them to individual fishers. If each fisher received
an “individual quota,” then the fisher could not increase his or her catch by building a bigger
boat. Each fisher would have an incentive to catch the assigned catch at the lowest possible cost,
in order to maximize the economic profit. Moveover, if these quotas were transferable, then
fishers could trade quota in order to minimize the overall costs. Many economists today support
the idea of “individual transferable quotas” or “ITQs.” ITQs have often had exactly the predicted
effect: fishers sold their quotas to other boats, so that the total cost of catching the quota was
reduced substantially. Rather than continuing the intense short fishing seasons, owners of ITQs
tended to catch fish over a much longer season, in order to avoid the low prices associated with
gluts on the market.
ITQs have proved to be a very valuable right. In many fisheries, the cost of leasing quota for a
single fishing season was 50% or more of the landed value of the catch. That is, if a pound of
fish sold for $4.00, then fishers would pay $2.00 for the right to use someone else’s right to catch
that pound of fish in that year. And if the permanent right was sold (rather than leased), the sales
price might be 10 to 20 times the annual lease price.

The reduction in fishing effort was good news to many economists. Very large values of ITQs
reflected the value of the stock of fish and the reduced costs of fishing. Just as a piece of land
that could produce a very valuable crop at low cost would be very valuable, so too was a stock of
fish an asset that could yield large annual returns. While governments historically have simply
given away fishery resources, the markets in ITQs indicated that these resources were extremely
valuable. A typical open access fishery that landed $100 million of fish might be able to generate
an implied lease value of $50 million per year. Clearly, public policy based upon the assumption
that these were resources of only marginal economic value had to be re-assessed. Many
biologists also supported ITQs because they reduced fishing effort dramatically, often eliminated
the chaos surrounding intense short seasons, and generally made management more orderly.
However, not everyone saw the rationalization of the fishery under ITQs as a benefit. The
reduction in fishing effort meant that some former crew members were no longer needed. In
areas where fishing was the primary employer, concerns about unemployment were inevitable.
Co-management and self-governance
Today ITQs remain a very controversial idea in most fisheries. For example, the re-authorization
of the Magnuson Act (which is currently being debated in Congress) will probably contain a
moratorium on new ITQ programs in federally-regulated fisheries. Some opponents of ITQs are
proposing management under which fishers collectively are given greater responsibility for
decisions. These proposals have come to be known as “co-management.”
The term “co-management” has been used to cover a wide array of actual and proposed
approaches to fisheries governance. (See, for example, the cases in Pinkerton [1989].) At one
extreme, some proposals for co-management are essentially more formalized consultative
arrangements, under which government agencies still retain the final authority. But the comanagement proposals for fundamentally different governance of fisheries involve giving real
authority to some organized fishers’ group. The fundamental issue in these alternative
governance structures is whether effective and sustainable self-governance institutions can
replace centralized, command-and-control regulation of fisheries.
There is very limited experience with self-governance of fisheries within market economies.
Japan has a complicated system of fisheries governance that includes local cooperative
governance of near-shore fisheries. There are some very unique treaty-based relationships
between First Nations and national governments, but which are of limited relevance in non-treaty
situations. There has been successful communal governance of fisheries resources in many
traditional societies with non-market economies, such as reef governance around various Pacific
islands. However, most of these communal governance structures have broken down or been
seriously stressed when market-oriented fishing began.
There is, however, considerable experience with collective self-governance of other natural
resources. These experiences include the common grazing grounds and common forests of
Europe and irrigation and water districts throughout the world. There are also extensive common
grazing lands and forests throughout the developing world, but these are often stressed by
population growth and by the pressures of market-oriented production. The grazing commons of
Europe and the irrigation and water districts provide the most interesting cases, because many of

these institutions have functioned successfully for decades or even centuries within market
economies.
The lessons from the self-governing commons of Europe are relatively clear. In stark contrast to
Hardin’s (1968) “Tragedy of the Commons” model, the grazing commons are not in fact open to
anyone. (Stevenson [1991] documents these institutions thoroughly.) The common areas,
typically summer grazing grounds, are open only to citizens of the village or town. Moreover,
villagers cannot put an unlimited number of animals on the commons. Typically, the right to put
an animal on the commons is “stinted,” or quantitatively defined on the basis of ownership of
other real estate. These rights convey with the sale of that land, and are thus a kind of property
right. Similar evidence on creation of rights that are well-defined can be found in the experiences
of successful irrigation districts in the U.S. and elsewhere in the world.
These experiences with other resources have important implications for successful comanagement of fisheries. There is compelling evidence that limiting access to the resource is an
inherent part of successful co-management. (Ostrom [1990] provides a comprehensive review
and synthesis of this research.) The users of a resource must be able to limit the overall use of the
resource to prevent overexploitation. The users of the resource must be able to ensure that
sacrifices made today to improve the resource will be repaid to those who made the sacrifices,
and not to some group of new entrants. And if resource users are to successfully negotiate a
sustainable management structure, there must be a stable set of institutions and players who can
work out their differences without the turmoil of constant change in membership and rules.
This is a crucial issue for fisheries co-management. Many proponents of self-governance
envision co-management that maintains open access. Co-management is sometimes promoted as
a management alternative that can avoid the difficult social issues (i.e., job displacement) raised
by ending open access. However there is compelling evidence that successful co-management of
fisheries cannot avoid the question of limiting access. To assume that fisheries resources are so
fundamentally different as to invalidate this relationship is implausible.
Some case histories of fisheries
It is a mistake to assume that all fisheries are identical or that all fisheries require essentially the
same management approach. Successful fisheries management requires an understanding of both
the broad lessons that can be learned from other fisheries and also the specifics of individual
fisheries. The differences in experiences among fisheries can be illustrated by a few case
histories.
Pacific halibut
The fishery for Pacific halibut in Alaska and Canada has gone through an archetypical evolution
of management. The U.S. and Canada, acting through the International Pacific Halibut
Commission, began setting halibut quotas before World War II. Those quotas were widely
credited with preserving the stock of fish. But each year, more and more fishers chased the same
quota, and each year the season was shortened. By the 1980s, the seasons were only two to three
weeks long. Because so much halibut was landed in a very short sea-son, most of the catch was
frozen. (Frozen halibut has a significantly lower value than fresh halibut in the retail market.) In

the 1990s, individual quotas were implemented in both Canada and Alaska. As predicted,
individual quotas ended the race to land fish, and fish were once again landed over most of the
year. As fish moved from the frozen market to the higher-valued fresh market, average landed
price per pound increased from 50% to 100%. The individual quotas proved to be quite valuable;
in Alaska, boats were willing to pay up to 70% of landed value to use quota. Also as predicted,
fewer boats and smaller crews were used in the less hectic individual quota fisheries. The crews
that did fish, fished longer and earned larger annual incomes from fishing. The total income to
crews was roughly the same as before ITQs. (Note that this meant that the crew share of landed
value declined substantially, because landed values increased.) Individual quotas benefited some
crew, while reducing total crew employment. And the political dimensions of the problems of
allocating ITQs are also clear. Alaska’s Senator Stevens and Representative Young, who chair
the Senate and House committees with fisheries jurisdiction, seem prepared to accept a
moratorium on new individual quota programs in the reauthorization of the Magnuson Act.
Constituent pressures almost certainly had some influence on their positions.
New England groundfishery
For many observers, the problems with the New England groundfishery illustrate the limitations
of the current version of the Magnuson Act. The New England Fishery Management Council
was created in 1976 by the Magnuson Act. One of the earliest actions of this Council was to
impose quotas for cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder, three of the major species caught by the
groundfish trawler fleet on Georges Bank and in the Gulf of Maine. These quotas were never
effective, in part because the National Marine Fisheries Service never committed the resources
necessary for effective enforcement. The Council abandoned quota management in 1981 in favor
of management based upon larger mesh sizes. But then the Council failed to follow through with
the increases in the mesh size that would have been required to protect stocks. Only after the
Conservation Law Foundation filed suit did the Council finally move towards reducing fishing
effort.
The bleak outlook for this fishery is widely known. Stocks are at historical lows. Most of the
U.S. section of Georges Bank has been closed indefinitely. The Council has adopted rules that
will close entry and will reduce fishing days per vessel by 50%. Even with these drastic
measures, recovery of the stocks may not be insured. And there have been the inevitable efforts
to allocate blame for this situation. The majority of the Council members are either heads of state
fishery agencies or public members from the fishing industry. Critics of the council process point
to the resultant pro-industry bias as one of the inherent limitations. The Council and the regional
office of the National Marine Fisheries Service often were antagonists, rather than collaborators,
in the process of managing groundfish. Each has blamed the other, and both have blamed the
inherently cumbersome regulatory structure imposed by the Magnuson Act and various federal
procedural statutes. But critics of New England’s particular problems point out that the other
seven regional councils, which operate under the same rules, have avoided the morass that seems
to plague the New England Council in groundfish (and also in scallops).

Maine lobsters
As Commissioner Alden pointed out, the crisis in the New England groundfishery is not typical
of the status of fisheries in Maine. Currently, for example, Maine’s lobster fishery is enjoying
record landings. The level of exploitation of Maine’s lobster fishery is very high; it is among the
most intensively fished stocks in the world. Biologists have long predicted, to their
embarrassment, that this very high level of fishing pressure would ultimately lead to a collapse of
lobster catches. Maine’s lobster fishery has been protected by a ban on capturing egg-bearing
females, by a minimum size, by a maximum size, and by trap design rules that permit
escapement of sub-legal lobsters. These rules on selectivity seem to have protected the lobster
stock despite intense fishing pressure. Historically, Maine has also had informal, local rules that
partially limited who could fish. Maine has now enacted legislation that incorporates local
decision-making, and which would seem to move Maine towards a more intrusive regulatory
strategy. Maine’s willingness to consider more restrictive regulatory regimes at this time is
driven at least in part by concerns over possible federal intervention in lobster regulation and in
part by the fear of a domino effect of displaced boats from federally-regulated fisheries moving
into lobsters.
Maine sea urchins
Maine’s sea urchin fishery seems destined to repeat the boom-and-bust cycle of urchin fisheries
around the world. Sea urchins are harvested for their roe (eggs) and the entire output is sold to
Japan. In a fishery that did not exist ten years ago, sea urchin landings are now second in Maine
only to lobsters in total value. But the last two years have seen the symptoms that have signaled
imminent collapse in urchin fisheries elsewhere: declining total landings, smaller urchins with
lower roe yields, and pursuit of urchins into deeper waters that yield lower quality urchins. Faced
with these signals, Maine initiated a moratorium on new entry and reduced the fishing season
slightly. Despite these steps, many observers fear a full-scale collapse.
These fisheries illustrate the diversity of experience seen in fisheries. There are fisheries, like
Pacific halibut, that fit the biological and economic theories perfectly; there are fisheries like
lobsters that seem to defy some of these theories and show great stability; there are highly
unstable fisheries like urchins. And this diverse experience is further complicated by the inherent
limitations and uncertainties in our understanding of the marine environment. This diversity and
uncertainty creates fundamental problems for the political process of fisheries management. In a
political process, the ability to illustrate one’s view by “telling stories” can be as compelling as
scientifically-tested evidence. Given the diversity of experience in fisheries, almost any
viewpoint can find support in anecdotes from particular fisheries.
The choices for Maine
The pressures on Maine’s fisheries are likely to continue. The value of seafoods can be expected
to continue to increase. Increases in population and in the demand for high quality food have
propelled a 200% increase in the real (after inflation) value per pound of Maine’s seafood
products between 1960 and 1985. Price growth has slowed during the recession of the late 1980s
and early 1990s, but there is every reason to expect at least slow growth in real prices of seafood.
Higher prices will mean more potential for profits and more interest in fishing.

The worldwide trend toward limited entry and ITQs will also put pressure on Maine’s fisheries.
There is already evidence that fishers displaced from the seriously depleted groundfish and
scallop stocks of the Georges Bank and the Gulf of Maine are turning to Maine fisheries like
lobsters and shrimp. And Maine social values have tended to think of the fisheries as an
employer of last resort. If the trend towards a growing economic gap between the well-educated
and the not-so- well-educated continues, economic pressures may push the economically
alienated back to fisheries.
The advice that traditional fisheries management would offer to Maine’s policy makers is clear.
Maine should move toward ITQs where ITQs are enforceable, and should move towards limited
entry and effort controls were ITQs are unenforceable. For fisheries like sea urchins, where the
number of buyers is small because the ultimate market is Japan, ITQs would be enforceable and
appropriate. For fisheries like lobsters, which can easily be sold in small lots to restaurants and to
consumers, ITQs are probably unenforceable. Therefore, traditional management would advise
limited entry and trap limits at levels that are well below current levels.
If Maine followed this conventional advice, it is certain that the lease value of ITQ rights and
limited entry rights per year would be at least 50% of landed value. That is, Maine’s $250-$300
million of fisheries landings could be expected to have a lease value of $125-$150 million. (To
put this figure in some perspective, this is about 8% of the annual state budget, or roughly the
amount the state spends on all its institutions of higher education.)
Maine will certainly not follow this advice. That efficient management of fisheries could yield
very large economic benefits to a relatively poor state is seemingly irrelevant to state fisheries
policy. The philosophy under-lying fisheries management in Maine has historically: (1) been
based upon open access; (2) required broad consensus among the affected fisheries interests for
enactment of any rules; and, (3) been modestly influenced by biological evidence. Moving to a
philosophy that emphasizes efficient use of marine resources is simply inconsistent with this
historic philosophy. But one could read into the recent lobster legislation a shift in management
philosophy that accepts the need for more activist regulation, but which proposes selfgovernance as the basis for governance changes.
The general outline of Maine’s seeming approach to co-management has some sound elements.
Starting the process in the lobster fishery, where the tradition of informal social controls provides
a favorable environment, maximizes the chances for success. Moving slowly, by limiting the
scope of the problems initially allocated to local lobster councils, seems similarly wise. If the
lobster councils do succeed, then this context will certainly be beneficial in other fisheries.
But Maine’s effort at co-management has not confronted a fundamental challenge. Many
supporters of the lobster co-management approach clearly believe that open access can be largely
preserved. As discussed above, this is simply inconsistent with the evidence from comanagement experience elsewhere. Co-management cannot avoid confronting the need to limit
access if it is to be successful. And any limitation on access will raise the ancillary question of
the economic value of the right to fish. Through co-management, fishers and their communities
may perhaps be able to reduce the negative impacts on existing social institutions. And the
decisions under co-management may be more acceptable than decisions imposed from Augusta.

But co-management is not a silver bullet that will avoid the unpleasant decisions that will
accompany an end to open access for fisheries.
Conclusions
Maine, like the rest of New England, has been very slow to adopt the fishery management
approaches that have become common in the rest of the world and even in the U.S. Maine would
like to think that the traditional fisheries management options of quotas, limited entry, and
restrictions on fishing effort are all avoidable.
Maine is perhaps willing to consider co-management as a vehicle towards greater control over
fishing activity. The exact meaning of co-management remains vague in this context, as it does
elsewhere. But it does seem that Maine is proceeding on the flawed assumption that comanagement can side-step the difficult question of limit-ing access to the resource. This
assumption is inconsistent with the experience in self-governance in a wide array of other
resources. If Maine really wants to stay on the co-management path, it will ultimately have to
face this fundamental issue.
Ralph E. Townsend is a professor of Economics at the University of Maine. His research
activities include a number of scholarly publications on the management of fisheries and natural
resources.
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